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ABSTRAK. Menurut pandangan Hardin, padang penggembalaan dan berbagai sumberdaya  milik 
bersama lainnya, biasanya dimanfaatkan oleh setiap orang secara bebas, tanpa ada insentif 
untuk mengkonservasinya. Karena itu, tidaklah heran bahwa berbagai sumberdaya milik bersama 
atau tidak ada pemiliknya sangat rentan mengalami “the tragedy of the commons”. Di samping 
itu, menurut Hardin, berbagai sumberdaya milik bersama hanya dapat dikelola dengan baik 
melalui swastanisasi atau dikontrol pihak pemerintah. Namun,  berdasarkan hasil-hasil studi dari 
berbagai kelompok masyarakat di berbagai wilayah, menunjukkan bahwa berbagai sumberdaya 
milik bersama, seperti maritim, padang penggembalaan, dan hutan tidak selalu mengalami 
degradasi. Hal ini dikarenakan berbagai sumberdaya milik bersama tersebut tidak selalu 
merupakan akses tanpa pemilikan,  dan bebas dimanfaatkan oleh setiap orang. Selain itu, 
kenyataan di lapangan juga menunjukkan bahwa pengelolaan sumberdaya milik bersama tidak 
selalu dapat dikelola secara efektif oleh pihak swasta atau pemerintah. Karena itu, tidaklah heran 
bahwa pandangan Hardin tersebut banyak dikritik oleh berbagai kalangan ilmuwan pasca Hardin. 
Artikel ini mendeskripsikan tantangan terhadap teori Hardin mengenai “the tragedy of the 
commons” bahwa berbagai sumberdaya milik bersama selalu rentan mengalami degradasi.
Kata kunci: tragedi milik bersama, berbagai sumberdaya milik bersama, degradasi lingkungan.    
ABSTRACT
ABSTRACT. According to Based on Hardin’s view’s model, pasture  land and other 
resources held in common have usually been freely utilized by everyone without any 
incentive for conserving and are therefore susceptible to “the tragedy of the commons”. 
In addition, the common property resources can be managed properly only by either the 
institution of private  or government action. However, on the basis of based on case 
studies from different societies in many regions undertaken by a number of scholars, the 
commons-property resources, such as marines, rangelandsrangelands, and forests, have 
not always  been degraded. This is because the common property resources are not 
always to open to all and freely utilized by anyone. Moreover, in reality, both private 
property and government have not always effectively managed the common property 
resources. As a result, the Hardin’s view has been criticized by a number of scholars of 
post Hardinian view. there is a basic philosophical difference in the use of the term 
“common property” between Hardin’s view and the contra Hardin view. According to 
Hardin, common-property resources are open to all. As a result, these common-property 
resources have been freely utilized by anyone and are prone to degradation. However, 
according to contra Hardin, the common-property resources are not always ownerless but 
in some cases are owned by well-defined social groups, for example, the local 
communities who manage the common-property resources. This paper describes the ideas 
that challenge  the theory of f Garret Hardin, namely “the tragedy of the commons” 
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revealed by Garret Hardin which who assumes , particularly in relation to the view that 
common-property resources are always susceptible to degradation.  
Key words: the tragedy of the commons, common-property resources, environmental 
degradation.    
TANTANGAN ATAS GAGASAN HARDIN TENTANG “THE TRAGEDY  OF 
THE COMMONS” 
Oleh 
Johan Iskandar 
Staf Dosen Biologi,Fakultas Matematika dan Ilmu Pengetahuan Alam (FMIPA), dan Staf 
Peneliti Pada Pusat Penelitian Sumber Daya Alam dan Lingkungan (PPSDAL), 
Universitas Padjadjaran Bandung
Email: ribibri@bdg.net.id
 
ABSTRAK
Menurut pandangan Hardin, padang penggembalaan dan berbagai sumberdaya  milik 
bersama lainnya, biasanya dimanfaatkan oleh setiap orang secara bebas, tanpa ada 
insentif untuk mengkonservasinya. Karena itu, tidaklah heran bahwa berbagai 
sumberdaya milik bersama atau tidak ada pemiliknya sangat rentan mengalami “the 
tragedy of the commons”. Di samping itu, menurut Hardin, berbagai sumberdaya milik 
bersama hanya dapat dikelola dengan baik melalui swastanisasi atau dikontrol pihak 
pemerintah. Namun,  berdasarkan hasil-hasil studi dari berbagai kelompok masyarakat di 
berbagai wilayah, menunjukkan bahwa berbagai sumberdaya milik bersama, seperti 
maritim, padang penggembalaan, dan hutan tidak selalu mengalami degradasi. Hal ini 
dikarenakan berbagai sumberdaya milik bersama tersebut tidak selalu merupakan akses 
tanpa pemilikan,  dan bebas dimanfaatkan oleh setiap orang. Selain itu, kenyataan di 
lapangan juga menunjukkan bahwa pengelolaan sumberdaya milik bersama tidak selalu 
dapat dikelola secara efektif oleh pihak swasta atau pemerintah. Karena itu, tidaklah 
heran bahwa pandangan Hardin tersebut banyak dikritik oleh berbagai kalangan ilmuwan 
pasca Hardin. Artikel ini mendeskripsikan tantangan terhadap teori Hardin mengenai “the 
tragedy of the commons” bahwa berbagai sumberdaya milik bersama selalu rentan 
mengalami degradasi.
Kata kunci: tragedi milik bersama, berbagai sumberdaya milik bersama, degradasi 
lingkungan.    
INTRODUCTION
      Since the early 1970s, particularly after the 1972 UN Conference on Human 
Environment, environmental issues have become  major global concern. Various 
problems of environmental degradation have been widely reported in both developed and 
developing countries. In developed countries various environmental problems, such as 
pollution, fish stock depletion, acid rain, and toxic waste have been widely known. 
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Unlike the developed countries, the most serious problems concerning environmental 
degradation in developing countries are domestic waste pollution, forest destruction, soil 
erosion, and loss of wildlife. 
The main issue both in the developed and developing countries related to over 
exploitation of the natural resources is the so-caolled   “tragedy of the commons”. This 
tragedy has been known for more than three decades since Garret Hardin first addressed 
it in 1968. According to Hardin’s model, “the tragedy of the commons” has occurred 
because pasture land or other resources, such as rivers, oceans, and forests, are held in 
common. Serious damage results because individuals do not see it in their own interest to 
protect those resources. Everyone tends to utilize these resources without any incentive 
for conserving them. According to Hardin, the tragedy results because; 
‘ … a pasture open to all. It is to be expected that each herds-man will try 
to keep as many cattle as possible on the commons. …... the rational 
herdsman concludes  that the only sensible course  for him to pursue is to 
add  another animal to his herd. And another; and another… … But this is 
conclusion is reached by each and every rational herdsman  sharing ain 
commons. Therein is the tragedy  (Hardin, 1968: 1244).  
The Hardin is viewmodel has a number of implicationimplications for the 
utilising other similar natural resources, such as the ocean. Therefore, each fisherman in 
his utilising fish in the ocean may apply the rational thinking of every herdsman, by 
analogy. the rational thinking of every herdsman, by analogy may be appied by each 
fisherman in his utilising the ocean. For example, why should one fisherman reduce his 
own harvest to conserve the fish in general when they will be taken by some one else in 
the near future (Acheson, 1989b: 199). Hardin has the view that the oceans of the world 
have suffered from degradation because these oceans are open to all. Similarly, the 
national parks have been considered as open to all, without limit. Therefore, to avoid the 
tragedy of the commons, the resources should be privatised or controlled by the 
government. (Hardin, 1968: 1245).   
The notion of the tragedy of commons  has been widely discussed and criticized 
by many scholars, including McCay and Acheson (1987); Berkes (1989); Acheson 
(1989b); Berkes et al.(1989), and Andelson (1991). This paper describes ideas of Post 
Hardinian that challenge idea of the tragedy of the commons based on case studies from 
different societies both in the developed and developing countries.
        
CONCEPT OF THE COMMON PROPERTY 
Natural resources play an important role for humankind in providing various 
functions, such as food and income. In utilising and managing natural resources many 
factors are involved. The most important is the type of property regimes: open-access, 
state, private, and common or communal property (Gibb and Bromley, 1989: 24; Berkes 
and Taghi Farvar, 1989; Berkes et al, 1985: 91).  Each of these has specific 
characteristics. Thus: (1) open-access means the absence of well-defined property rights, 
whereby access is free and open to all; (2) private property refers to the situation in which 
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an individual or corporation has the right to exclude others from using the resource and to 
regulate its use; (3) under communal property, the resource is held by an identifiable 
community of users who can exclude the others and regulate use; (4) state property or 
state governed property ensures that rights to the resources are vested exclusively in 
government (Berkes et al., 1985: 91).
Based on these four categories of property regimes, there is a basic philosophical 
difference in the use of the term “common property” between Hardin and the post 
Hardinian. According to Hardin’s view, common property  is not owned by anyone. It is 
a free goods, owned by no one and belonging to every one, e.g. range land resources. In 
contrast, according to the post Hardinian view, common property should be restricted to 
communally owned resources, i.e. those resources for which there exist communal 
arrangements for the exclusion of non-owners and for allocation among co-owners 
(Berkes and Taghi Farvar, 1989:7). In other words, the common property resources are 
not ownerless (res nullius)) but are owned in common (res communes) by well-defined 
social groups in the local community (Berkes, 1985b: 202). For example, it has been 
recognised that in many countries and regions, such as Indonesia, Japan, Melanesia, 
Papua New Guinea, Canada, and North America, the informal territoriality of some 
marine environments is recognized as being owned and managed by the local community 
(Johannes, 1982a; Berkes, 1985b; Acheson, 1987; Carrier, 1987; Ruddle, 1989; Wahyono 
et al., 2000).
HARDIN’S MODEL AND THE TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS    
The concept of common property in relation to resource depletion was first 
introduced by Garret Hardin (1968), which discussed the world population problem in an 
article published in Science. Hardin (1968: 1243), points out that a finite world can 
support only a finite population, which means that the per capita share of the world’s 
goods must steadily decrease. Seemingly, there is no technical solution to solve this 
problem, rather a fundamental extension in morality is required. He discusses this 
dilemma in a simplified way by using the example of pastoral utilisation. According to 
Hardin (1968:1244), a pasture is open to all. Therefore, if one of the herdsmen adds more 
and more animals in his herds, explicitly or implicitly, more or less consciously, he 
depletes the communal sources. Moreover, Hardin mentions that:
“This utility has one negative and one positive component. 1)  The positive 
component is a function of the increment of one animal. Since the herdsman 
receives all the proceeds from the sale of the additional animal, the positive utility 
is nearly +1. 2) The negative component is a function of the additional 
overgrazing created by one more animal. Since, however, the effects of 
overgrazing are shared by all the herdsmen, the negative utility for any particular 
decision-making herdsman is only a fraction of –1 (1968: 1244)”. 
Hardin suggests that to solve this problem, either government control or privatisation is 
required. 
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Hardin’s theory has been widely criticized and rejected by a number of scholars 
on a variety of grounds. According to pPost Hardinian view, the tragedy of the commons 
introduced by Hardin infers a number of basic assumptions (c.f. Stillman, 1975; Acheson, 
1989b: 375-378):
(1) That common resources involve the absence of private property or are owned by no 
one and belong to everyone;
(2) That the user is selfish. The individual has to be able to pursue self-interest to achieve 
economic goals, which over exploit resources on which their livelihood depends, 
without considering other users;
(3) That the user has the technical capacity to exploit the common property resource, 
resulting in the rate of extraction exceeding the natural replenishment of the resource;
(4) That the community which depends on common property resources cannot and will 
not erect effective institutions to protect that resources; and
(5) Those common property resources can be well managed only by either the institution 
of private property or government action.
CRITICISM OF HARDIN’S MODEL
Case studies from different societies in various regions, related to  marine, range land 
and forest ecosystems, show that the opose  the oppose mentioned basic assumptions of 
the Hardin’s model can be challenged  on a number of grounds, as discussed below: 
Firstly, the common resources involve the absence of private property or are owned 
by no one and belong to the environment. In reality, based on analysis from different  
regions, the common resources, such as marine resources in many regions of Asia, 
Oceania, Canada, and USA have not been unregulated as open access, but rather belong 
to local communities (Acheson, 1975, 1987; MacCay, 1980; Berkes, 1985a, 1985b; 
Chapman, 1985; Ruddle, 1989; Carrier, 1987; Hudson, 192; Johannes, 1982b; Spring, 
1982).  . 
Second, the users are selfish individuals driven to achieve economic goals by over 
exploiting resources on which their livelihoods depend. In reality, individual rights are 
subordinate to community rights. For example, based on some case studies, the local 
fishermen of Indonesia, Japan, Turkey, and Canada have not freely exploited their 
marines resources because they have been traditionally controlled by informal leaders, 
“harbour gang”, and so on (Acheson  1975; Ruddle, 1989; Wahyono et al., 2000; Marten, 
2001). Similarly, the traditional pastoralists and swidden cultivators have not freely 
exploited their local resources since informal or local leaders have restrained practices 
(Little, 1985).
Third, individuals are using common-property resources and communities in which 
they live cannot and will not erect effective institutions to protect those resources. As we 
have seen in many instances, such as in Maluku, Sulawesi and Papua of Eastern 
Indonesia, local village societies have generated special institutions called sasi to control 
overexploitation of local marine resources  (Wahyono et al., 2000).     
Forth, the common-property  resources can be managed only by either the institution 
of private property or government action. In reality, however, both private property and 
government have not always effectively managed the common property resources. For 
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example, the forest in Indonesia has not been effectively managed by the private sector  
(forest concession holder or HPH) or by the semi-government bodies (Inhutani). 
).Consequently, widespread forest destruction in many areas of Indonesia, such as East 
Kalimantan, has not been avoided (Iskandar and Ginanjar, 2002) .
F     The fifth, the user has the technical capacity to exploit the common resource. 
Therefore, over-exploitation has not been avoided. In reality, however, local communities 
have not either the ability or the motive to over exploit common-property resources. In 
general, local communities have built up an extensive knowledge, which they have 
received from earlier generations and from trial and error over a long time. This 
knowledge allows them to appropriately manage their local resources, to their socio-
economic and ecological advantage. Various indigenous management and conservation 
systems have been known in Indonesia, such as: 
(1). Subak, traditional irrigation management system in Bali (Arawata, 2003);
(2). Lubuk latangan, river tenure management system in Tapanuli (Lubis, 1999);
(3). Sasi darat, land tenure management system in Maluku, and sasi laut, sea enure 
management system in Maluku, Sulawesi, and Papua (Wahyono et al, 2000). 
(4). Tana’ ulen, traditional forest management  system of indigenous Dayak, East Kalimantan 
(Lamis et al. 1999);
(5). Leuweung lembur and leuweung titipan, traditional forest management and conservation 
system  of indigenous Baduy South Banten (Iskandar, 1998); and 
(6). Leuweung kolot or Leuweung Geledegan, and Leuweung Titipan, traditional forest 
management and conservation system of indigenous Kasepuhan, Cisolok,  Sukabumi 
(Adimihardja, 2004).
(a). Subak, traditional irrigation management system in Bali (Arawata, 2003);
(b). Lubuk latangan, river tenure management system in Tapanuli (Lubis, 1999);
             (c). Sasi darat, land tenure management system in Maluku, and sasi 
laut, sea       
                   tenure management system in Maluku, Sulawesi, and Papua 
(Wahyono et al, 
                  2000). 
((d). Tana’ ulen, traditional forest management  system of indigenous Dayak, 
East
        Kalimantan (Lamis et al. 1999);
(e). Leuweung lembur and leuweung titipan, traditional forest management and 
      conservation system  of   
      of indigenous Baduy South Banten (Iskandar, 1998); and 
(f). Leuweung klolot or Leuweung Geledegan, and Leuweung Titipan, traditional 
      forest management and conservation system   of indigenous Kasepuhan, 
      Cisolok,  Sukabumi 
      (Adimihardja, 2004). 
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THE USE OF COMMON-PROPERTY RESOURCES
It has been discussed earlier that some basic assumptions of the tragedy of the 
commons have not proven to be true. The following are case studies of the use of 
common-property resources from different societies in various regions, described by a 
number of scholars.
Marine
According to Hardin’s model, the marine or ocean environment is considered 
“common property” or “open access”. As mentioned by Hardin: 
   
‘…the oceans of the world continue to suffer from the survival of the philosophy 
of the commons. Maritime nations still respond automatically to the shibboleth of 
the “freedom of the seas”. Professing to believe in the “inexhaustible resources of 
the ocean,” they bring species after species of fish and whales closer to extinction’ 
(1968: 1245).    
The first thing to be considered about this prediction is that that it tends to emphasize 
the non-limitation of individual rights to utilise natural common resources. In reality, 
however, individual rights are usually affected by constraining social factors, such as the 
beliefs and norms of a community. In other words, according to Acheson (1989b: 375-
376), individual rights are subordinate to community rights. In virtually all societies, 
there are controls on access to resources and various kinds of rules and institutional 
arrangements to limit exploitative activities. Individuals are not allowed to seek their 
short-term goals at the expense of the society. Thus, for instance, in a fishing community 
it is important to control the use of the natural resources which can create limited 
property rights over fishery resources.
Various kinds of fishery tenure systems exist in different regions (Acheson, 1989a; 
Berkes, 1985a: 202; Wahyono et al., 2000; Soselisa, 2001; Marten, 2001: 160-161), for 
example:      
(1) property rights of cooperatives for a variety of inshore fisheries in Japan  and 
Turkey;   
(2)  group territories (harbour gang) of lobster trappers in inshore Maine, USA; 
(3) exclusive rights by group of villages to reefs and lagoons in Oceania; 
(4) community resource use rights for gill-net and seine fishing in James Bay, 
Quebec; 
(5) licensed community of fishing cooperative rights for shrimp weirs in Gulf of 
California; and 
(6) exclusive rights by group of villages to sea and its resources, such as fish, shrimps, 
and turtle in Papua, Sulawesi and Maluku of Eastern Indonesia. This traditional 
regulation has been popularly known as sasi laut. 
In Japan, for example, it has long been the case that fishing rights to marine waters are 
controlled by the community based on customary village tenure. Nowadays, some 
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traditional values and behavioural norms are still recognised. For example, in one 
cooperative on Lake Biwa, which has been administered for about a century for 
fishermen as a “small sea”, koumi, the use of fish weirs, was allocated solely to village 
paupers (Ruddle, 1989: 174). More generally, each fisherman enjoys legally guaranteed 
equitable access to and ownership of the living aquatic resources in coastal waters. 
     In Turkey, many traditional fishing villages have territorial authority over fishing 
areas near the village. As a result, the fishermen have distinct ownership that is essential 
for avoiding tragedy of the commons in a coastal fishery. Moreover, the fishermen have 
made special traditional rules, which are easily understood by every one. For example, 
they are also fair despite the complexities of good sites, poor sites and fish movements 
during the year. Every fisherman has an opportunity to fish good sites as well as poor 
ones (Martin, 2001:160-161).
Similarly, in Eastern Indonesia, such as Papua, Maluku, and Sulawesi, the sea 
tenure system (hak ulayat) has been widely recognised. According to Lokollo (1988), 
cited by Wahyono et al.. (2000), the traditional rules (sasi) have been traditionally 
applied in Maluku since the sixteenth century. Based on sasi, the local community has 
traditionally managed their exclusive, distinctive fishing areas, which are normally 
bordered by hills, cape, cave, village borders, stakes, and shallow waters. To manage the 
coastal fishery, every local fisherman has been allowed to fish only certain months in 
each year during the open fishing season. Conversely, during the closed fishing season, 
all fishermen are prohibited from fishing. This traditional rule has been controlled by 
village informal leaders using a system which is called Kewang in Maluku or Dewan 
Adat in Papua. Fishermen who violate these rules are usually given penaltiesfinalty, such 
as by paying money.   
According to Carrier (1982: 146), in many islands in Melanesia, such as Ponam 
Island, maritime ownership is commonly owned by groups, such as clans, lineages or 
other kinship groups. Only fishing equipment is owned as personal property. However, 
those areas of reef and sea and those species and fishing techniques that are owned are 
the property of patrilineal descent groups. Johannes and Spring describe similar 
arrangements to those mentioned by Carrier. According to Johannes (1982a: 259), 
although traditional fishing rights have largely disappeared from island groups, such as 
Hawaii, the Mariannas, Ponape, and American Samoa, in other island countries, such as 
Fiji, Palau Yap and much of Papua New Guinea, these rights are not only still practised 
but are also protected through explicit or implicit legal recognition. Thus, the right to fish 
in a particular area is controlled by a clan, chief or family. Moreover, in many Papua 
New Guinean villages, the boundaries of traditional inter village fishing areas are often 
marked by lining-up obvious features along the outer reef edge, such as the channel 
mouth or protruding rocks, with the coastline. In addition, one fishing boundary between 
two villages or islands is marked very obviously by clearing coral and rock along the 
boundary line to form a kind of underwater path readily observable from a canoe 
(Johannes, 1982b: 240-241). Spring (1982: 203-204) also points  out that in some parts of 
Papua New Guinea, various animals, such as fish, turtle and shellfish belong to certain 
families within the village. Therefore, these animals cannot be hunted by people from 
other villages without obtaining permission from the owners.
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     These kinds of sea tenure systems are not only known from in the Eastern societies 
but also fromin Western societies. According to Acheson (1975: 187-191), in Maine, 
USA, from an official point-of-view, anyone who has a license can go lobster fishing 
anywhere. However, in realty far more  is required. For example, to go fishing, one needs 
to be accepted by the men fishing out of one harbour and one has to gain admission to 
“the harbour gang”.
In Maine there are two different types of lobster fishing territory management 
systems: nucleated and perimeter-defended. In general, it is relatively easy to gain 
acceptance to harbour gangs in nucleated areas. Particularly if a person is a resident of the 
community and shows a willingness to abide by local fishing norms, the person will 
eventually be accepted into the local gang. However, it is vastly more difficult to gain 
admission to harbour gangs that maintain perimeter-defended territories, which are 
located outside the nucleated areas.
      Similarly, in the Great Lakes, Canada, fishermen are able to manage fishing areas by 
making borders based on mutual agreement. Such allocations operate informally, and are 
therefore more efficient and flexible (Berkes, 1985b; 192). In this case, it can be seen that 
informal regulation is more applicable than those of the formal government regulation.
To sum up, in some regions access to the marine resource is not open to all as 
assumed by Hardin’s model, but is controlled by identifiable local communities of users. 
Moreover, each is restrained from acting entirely in that person’s own selfish, short-term 
interest by various informal regulations, beliefs, taboos, and the actions of informal 
leaders.
Range Land
According to Hardin’s model, traditional pastoralism in many regions will 
inevitably lead to overgrazing due to the selfishness of each herdsman. In reality, from 
many case studies, overgrazing is avoided by pastoralists of Africa because they have a 
specific  social organization. For instance, grazing land can be managed through cyclic 
dynamic movement involving traditional institutions. The Il Chamus, Kenya, are a case 
in point. They have traditional means of regulating pastoral grazing systems called 
olokeri (Little, 1985: 139). Under the olokeri system, the swamp and certain high land 
areas are restricted, and can only be grazed in the good seasons. The main purpose of this 
is to hold in reserve certain grazing land in the good seasons due to the relative 
abundance of grasses at the time. 
However, in the bad seasons these areas can be grazed due to lack of grasses in 
many other places. Thus, these areas function as “rangelands reserve stock”. An 
appropriate time to close these areas is decided by a council leader (lamaal). One lamaal 
is usually composed by a coalition of two or three neighbor units. The control of this area 
is usually accomplished by young males between 18-30 years of age called Ilmuaran 
(Little, 1985: 139). Decisions to restrict access to an area are made according to both the 
conditions of livestock and the range. For example, if the livestock are in good condition 
and there is sufficient grazing in the wet season range, then the area will be restricted. 
These areas, however, can be opened when there is a lack of grazing land in many areas, 
and when the livestock are also in a bad condition. Decisions concerning the time and 
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place to graze are increasingly left up to the individual unit, although recognition is still 
made of the olokeri (Little, 1985: 139).
In order to avert either overgrazing and grazing land destruction, livestock are 
grazed in small herds. By splitting their livestock into several small herds, livestock more 
efficiently utilise resources and survive food shortage better than animals in large herds 
(Western and Finch, 1986: 90). By this strategy, grazing land can be maintained 
appropriately to achieve sustainable production on a long-term basis. In addition, to 
reduce the risk of over grazing, livestock are also divided into smaller herds and looked 
after by relatives or friends in different areas. Therefore, by this strategy the livestock can 
be maintained in different areas because grasses are distributed differently in different 
places. Moreover, social interrelationships can be maintained.
Another important aspect which needs to be discussed is the movement of herds. 
Hardin mentions  that ‘… a pasture opens to all. It is to be expected that each herds-man 
will try to keep as many cattle as possible on the commons’ (Hardin, 1968: 1244). 
Regarding this, Based on Hardin’s view as mentioned above, it seems that each 
herdsman adds animals without considering the territory of each herdsman group. In 
reality, however, pastoralists usually move dynamically in order to develop a strategy of 
survival, which has a spatial pattern, ranging from the simple, seasonal, and short 
distance transhumance, to long-distance movement (Windstrand, 1975: 150). But such 
movements are restricted by territoriality and the involvement of various social 
organisations. According to Dyson-Hudson and Dyson-Hudson (1969), because of the 
patchy and unpredictable nature of resources and the individualized pattern of herd 
movement, territorial ownership of fixed grazing areas is not a viable strategy for the 
Karimojong of Uganda. However, at a  particular point in time the number of cattle 
grazing in an area can be regulated by social interactions. A herd-owner moving to a new 
grazing area must request permission of the people already herding in the area, who are 
organised into an ephemeral political unit termed a “clump cluster’. These social 
interactions allow exchange of information and can operate to regulate the number of 
herds in a particular area at a particular point in time in relation to the available resources. 
In times of severe shortage the people who are associated in a camp cluster may exclude 
other Karimojong from the area where they are grazing, or from sharing their water 
supply, and enforce the exclusion by fighting with sticks. Therefore, territoriality is 
important for the pastoralists in order to adapt to their environment.   
 
Forest
     According to Hardin’s model, various forestland use types, including national parks 
are a common property resources. He mentions that, as is mentioned by him that:
‘The National Parks present another instance of the working out of the tragedy 
of the commons. At present, they are open to all, without limit’ (Hardin, 1968: 
1245).
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It is clear, however, based on case studies from different regions, theat forest is 
not always open to all, without limit. For example, historically, forestlands in some 
regions of Southeast Asia have traditionally belonged to the community. In Indonesia, it 
has long been recognised that according to customary law (adat) some local community 
groups have rights to forestland called hak ulayat. Based on the Agrarian Law of 1960 
(Undang-Undang Pokok Agraria 1960), for example, such land rights have been 
recognised:
The implementation of the communal property of the hak ulayat (the communal 
rights of an adat community), and the rights similar to that of adat community, in 
so far as they exist, shall be adjusted such as to fit in the national and state’s 
interest, based on the unity of the nation and shall not be in conflict with the acts  
and other regulation of higher level ……..   Article 3 (SKEPHI and Kiddell-
Monroe, 1993: 237).
Nowadays, such rights to land are mostly recognised in Outer Indonesia, such as 
Sumatera, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, Maluku and Papua, where the larger forest areas are 
still to be found. In Inner Indonesia (Java and Bali), however, hak ulayat is almost 
disappear. Land  rarely recognised any more. This is due to high population pressure on 
land and a rapid development programme in Java and Bali. Thus, land has been privatised 
and intensively used for a long time (Geertz, 1963). Only in certain , special areas,  is hak 
ulayat still to be found, such as in the Baduy community, South Banten hak ulayat is still 
to be found (Iskandar, 1998). 
In Indonesia, communal land is usually used for practising swidden cultivation called 
ladang. Other non timber forest products, such as rattan, resin, aloe wood (gaharu), iron 
wood (ulin), edible mushrooms, edible bird’s nests, and wildlife have also playan an 
important role for swidden cultivators in order to fulfil their home consumption as well 
for their income. from some surpluses sold in markets.
Local communities who live in the forest areas use primary forest (hutan primer or 
rimba) as a collective resource. However, rights to swidden fields (lahan ladang) are 
often individual. According to Appell (1986: 120), the swidden plots are initially 
established by cutting the primary forest (rimba) and planted by rice in one or two years 
successively. After harvesting rice, the swidden plots (ladang) are normally fallowed and 
recultivated after fallowing more than 5 years. Moreover, by natural vegetation 
succession process, it has become the secondary forest (belukar) and affirmatively 
belonged to each household. As a result,   rights to swidden plots and fallowed lands land 
in various groups in Borneo, such as the Iban, the Bidayuh Land Dayak, the Kenyah, the 
Ma’anyan, the Melanau, the Bisaya, the Kantu’ Dayak, the Selako Dayak, the Maloh, the 
Punan Bah, are belonged to each independence house hold instead of belonging to 
collective resource. created by cutting primary forest (rimba tua). These swidden plots 
and fallowed land rights may be exercised over a period of years or permanently, and 
may be transferred to other jural entities.
Among the Iban and Dayak, for example, swidden fields (ladang) are passed equally 
to all descendants (Freeman, 1955; Dixon, 1974). As a result, eEach person in a village , 
therefore, belongs to a number of land holding descent groups and each plot is subject to 
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cultivation by a number of persons. According to Each family, customary law, each 
household of the swidden farmer thereforis normally  allowed to open e, each year has 
independentthe primary forest to plan rice annually. The size of swidden plot for each 
household is normally , separate swidden plots the size of which is determined by the 
availability of the labour in the family (Freeman, 1955). Moreover, each individual 
makes their own decisions for managing their swidden fields, although constrained by 
some informal community regulations. Under the traditional system, the decision to 
select certain new swidden fields before planting upland rice each year is always 
discussed together in a meeting attended by all bilek family representatives.
Traditionally, as long as forest land is plentiful and the agricultural techniques are 
sensitive to the local environment, swidden cultivation systems may be productive in 
terms of labour and ecological sustainability (Conklin, 1957; Geertz, 1963; Dove, 1985). 
Therefore, the tragedy of the commons, as predicted by Hardin, need not occur in 
practice under a traditional swidden cultivation system. Forest is not free good, , but 
rather each swidden field and area of secondary forest “belongs” to a particular group. 
This system, however, cannot always be sustained on a long-term basis. This is due to 
prevailing circumstances, for example, population pressure, and external factors, such as 
logging, commercial plantations, transmigration programmes, and mining projects 
(Kartawinata et al., 1981; Rigg, 1991; Colchester and Lochmann, 1993).
Unlike claims to swidden fields, claims to timber forest products are not clearly fixed 
for each individual. Therefore, according to Hardin’s model, such resources might seem 
doomed to overexploitation, because everyone wants to harvest such resources as much 
as possible before they will be taken by somebody else. In reality, however, these 
resources have been utilised by local communities collectively on a sustainable base. The 
selfish instincts of individuals in utilizing these resources have been mitigated by beliefs 
and norms of the societies.
In many areas of East Kalimantan, for example, swidden cultivators can harvest non 
timber forest products from the fallowed secondary forests, which have been claimed by 
each household, as well as from primary forests, which have not yet been claimed by 
anyone (Iskandar and Ginanjar, 2002). Various trees as well as animals which provide 
benefit for them are usually managed in similar ways. For example, in cutting trees for 
swidden fields, rattan, resin, aloe wood (gaharu) and iron wood (ulin) are never cut. 
Moreover, if they find trees which are habitat for nesting honeybees, such trees are 
usually conserved to provide some benefits for them. Therefore, these trees are usually 
found in the swidden as well as primary forest areas.
According to De’Ath (1982: 206) swidden agriculturalists in Papua New Guinea also 
carefully manage land for swiddening. Farmers are very selective in terms of slope, soil, 
drainage, sunlight, and do not misuse gardening plots because they know their 
descendants will have to return to them. In addition, there are also controls on forest 
resource use associated with territoriality. The hunters and gatherers stake out territories 
and limit incursions by outsiders. Some restrictions are also applied to hunting animals. 
For example, to hunt animals, some aspects must be considered first. These include 
limitation on the time animals can be killed, who is permitted to kill them, where they 
may be killed, and who eats them (De’Ath, 1982).
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In short, local communities in different regions have tended to manage forests 
appropriately. As a result, the forests have not been considered as open to all. Thus, the 
tragedy of the commons has been avoided.    
         
DISCUSSION
The tragedy of the commons was proposed by Garret Hardin in an essay, which 
was first published in 1968.  According to Hardin:
The tragedies of the commons develop in this way. Picture a pasture open to 
all. It 
is to be expected that each herds-man  will try to keep as many cattle as possible 
on the commons. Such an arrangement may work reasonably satisfactorily for 
centuries because tribal wars, poaching, and disease keep the number of both 
man 
and beast well below the carrying capacity of the land. Finally, however, comes 
the day of reckoning, that is the day when the long-desired goal of social 
stability 
became a reality. At this point, the inherent logic of the commons remorselessly 
generate tragedy (1968: 1244).
Based on Hardin’s opinionn’s suggestion, it can be inferred that pastures or other 
resources, such as oceans, and forests, which are held in common, are open to all and 
susceptible to degradation because individuals want to maximize yields and to minimize 
costs. Moreover, they do not want to conserve the common-property resources. 
Conversely, if the resources are privately owned, individuals might try to conserve their 
resources because the degrading of those resources will cost them in the long run by 
decreasing their yields. Therefore, to minimize costs and maximize yields, private owners 
will find it rational to conserve their resource. Therefore, according to Hardin, the 
degradation of private resources can be avoided, while degradiondegradation of common 
resources is inevitable.      
However, the Hardin assumption, in reality, is not totally applicable it can not be 
applied both in the developed and developing countries. Because based on many case 
studies from different societies in various regions, the local communities have tended to 
succeed in sustainablysustainable managing the common-property resources, particularly 
marine, forests, and range lands. For example, based on my study among the Baduy 
community in South Banten, Indonesia, it can be inferred that the Baduy communal 
forests have tended to be managed successfully. 
The Baduy divide forest into two main categories: protected and non-protected 
(Iskandar, 1998). Protected forest constitutes those areas that have never been open for 
swiddening (huma), and which the Baduy call leuweung kolot (old mature forest not 
known to have been previously farmed), large forest (leuweung gede) or entrusted forest 
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(leuweung titipan). In addition, there are some small plots of protected forest located on 
hills (dungus). In general, protected forest (leuweung kolot or leuweung gede) is found in 
Inner Baduy. Two of the most important protected forest areas are Arca Domas and 
Sasaka Domas, located in Cikeusik and Cibeo, respectively. These places can be visited 
only once a year by informal leaders (puun), who are accompanied by a few people both 
Inner and Outer Baduy who undertake ascetic rituals (ziarah). This takes place during the 
month of Kalima in the Baduy calendar.
Another forest type, reuma kolot (mature fallowed forest), indicates forest which can 
be opened for swiddening If protected forest has been opened for swiddening, the term 
leuweung is usually no longer used and is replaced by reuma. Moreover, if reuma is 
opened to established settlement, the anthropogenic forest surrounding the hamlet is 
called lindung lembur  (hamlet shelter forest) or dukuh lembur (hamlet fruits).
Thus, by applying the traditional management system, the Baduy communal forests 
have tended to be managed appropriately. In other words, the forests which are held in 
common, have not been seriously damaged because individuals do see it in their own 
interest to protect those forests.   
According to the suggestion of John Reader (cited by Andelson, 1991: 37), ‘the true 
commons’ may be defined as an area of mutual benefit and responsibility, managed by 
those using it in a manner that acknowledges that environmental resources have 
limitations. Access to the common is restricted by entitlement; use is regulated to ensure 
that no individual can pursue their own interest to the detriment of others. Far from 
bringing ruin to all, the true commons functions to keep its exploitation within 
sustainable limits, thus providing every commoner with a dependable food supply in the 
short term, and maintaining the viability of available resources for generations to come. 
Many factors may determine the success of local communities in managing the 
common-property resources. One of these factors is social capital. It mainly consists of 
three components, namely (1) crafting institution, ability of the community to craft 
institutions in managing the common-property resources; (2) equal participation, equal 
participation of community members in managing the common property; and (3) trust, 
growing of trust among community members in managing the common-property 
resources (c.f. Lubis 1999).
Conversely, based on some case studies show that the management of resources by the 
private sector has not avoided degradation. One such example is the overgrazing in the 
Great American Desert, where private ownership has led to degradation of the 
environment. Additionally, the communal grazing lands of the Borana of Ethiopia have 
been more productive in terms of protein per acre at a lower cost than private grazing 
lands in comparable climates of Australian cattle rangeland (Ember and Ember, 1996). 
Actually, the misapprehension of common-property resources has been realized 
by Hardin, as he mentions that: 
‘the title of my 1968 paper should have been “The Tragedy of the Unmanaged 
 Commons”.   
 …. The farmers on Hardin pasture do not seem to talk to one another. As 
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 individuals, they are alienated, rational, utility maximizing automatons and 
little 
else. The sum total of their social life is the grim, Hobbestian struggle of each 
against all and all together against the pasture in which they are trapped. This is 
a 
serious misapprehension of the evidence, as can be shown by abandoning the 
hypothetical model to examine some relevant empirical evidence.’ (Hardin, 
1991: 
178-179).    
According to these examples, it can be seen that Hardin’s model of “the tragedy 
of commons” has some weaknesses. Particularly, the high variety of social systems of the 
local communities, including population, values, ideology, economy, technology, and 
social organization in interaction with the ecosystem (c.f. Rambo, 1983), has been 
ignored by Hardin. 
Thus, development and commercialization may be more important than private versus 
communal ownership in leading to overgrazing or overfishing (Ember and Ember, 1996). 
For example, various strategies developed by indigenous pastoralists of Africa, which 
have failed to solve the problems in managing their common-property have not been 
caused by communal ownership leading to overgrazing. Rather, they have failed to 
manage their commons mainly due to external factors, such as governmental control, 
encroachment of agropastoralists, and influence by the establishment of nature reserves 
and national park development (Ayeni, 1983).
Some governmental programmes are introduced to control rangelands in different 
regions of Africa, which leads to the loss of pastoral lands or restriction on the territories 
of pastoral people. In many places, pastoralist land areas are now controlled by 
governments. Pastoralists, however, tend to refuse changes in the status of their grazing 
land. Therefore, their land might be replaced by other communities. For instance, the 
Fulani, refuse to change the status of their land, pay taxes or buy land already used by 
them. According to their beliefs, all land along their traditional routes belongs to them 
(Ayeni, 1983: 24). Therefore, they refuse to buy land in order to get strong autonomy and 
free movement. 
In some regions of Africa, such as Somalia, Bostwana, Niger, and Mali, pastoralists 
are influenced by livestock investment of absentee herd ownership by outsiders, such as 
businessmen, civil servants, townsmen and farmers who purchase livestock The result is 
disturbance of traditional grazing patterns and institutions due to the activities of non-
indigenous pastoralists lacking local knowledge. Moreover, outsiders tend to seek 
benefits on a short-term basis with less attention to pastoral conservation systems. .
In Eastern Indonesia, which had traditional conservation practices popularly know as 
sasi laut, serious overfishing apparently only became a problem. m when the local people 
failed to control their sea tenure. Theis failure in management of the resource was caused 
by outsider interventions and motorized fishing boats (c.f. Wahyono et al, 2000).  
Similarly, forests of Outer Indonesian areas, such as East Kalimantan have been 
seriously damaged as a result of the introduction of development and commercialization 
activities, such as logging, commercial plantation, transmigration, and mining projects, 
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instead of the communal forest management systems undertaken by local communities 
(c.f. Iskandar and Ginanzar, 2002).        
Thus, it is clear from this discussion of the studies of human ecologists, 
anthropologists, and researchers in other disciplines, that the theory of common-property 
resources needs to be extended and modified in several ways if it is to be applied 
appropriately to various local social systems and ecosystems in different regions of both 
developed and developing countries.
CONCLUSION
To sum up, the common-property resources, which have usually been managed by 
the local communities in different regions of both the developed and developing 
countries, have not necessarily led to environmental degradation as predicted in Hardin’s 
model. In fact, the common-property resources have widely been managed appropriately 
by local communities because these local communities have strong social capital, 
consisting of crafting institutions, equality of participation, and trust. 
Recently, however, as conditions have changed, many traditional strategies are no longer 
appropriate or sufficient. The common-property resources have tended to fail to be 
properly managed by the local communities. Apparently, various internal and external 
factors, including population increase, market economic penetration, and government  
policies have undoubtedly affected the local communities in managing the  common-
property resoucesresources. Therefore, new strategies involving more appropriate 
management concepts must be developed for sustainable management of common-
property resources in the future.
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